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The Evolution of Altruism
Abstract
In The Evolution of Cooperation, Axelrod and Hamilton (A&H) provide a game theoretic approach to the
evolution of reciprocal altruism (cooperation). They argue that because Tit-For-Tat (TFT) is robust, stable,
and initially viable, it can be used to explain how reciprocal altruism evolved in nature. There are three
important issues regarding A&H’s approach to which the author responds. First, Nowak and Sigmund
challenge the robustness of TFT by arguing that a strategy of Win-Stay, Lose-Shift (WSLS) can outperform
TFT. Second, although A&H use clustering to account for the initial viability of TFT, they owe an
explanation of how a cluster of TFTs could arise in the first place. Finally, A&H account for the stability of
TFT by assuming, without empirical or theoretical support, that the individuals who interact have a
sufficiently large probability of meeting again. The author will respond to these three issues in order to
improve and extend A&H’s approach to the evolution of cooperation.
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Eithan Graber

The Evolution of Altruism
In The Evolution of Cooperation, Axelrod and Hamilton (A&H) provide a game theoretic
approach to the evolution of reciprocal altruism (cooperation). They argue that because Tit-ForTat (TFT) is robust, stable, and initially viable, it can be used to explain how reciprocal altruism
evolved in nature. There are three important issues regarding A&H’s approach to which I will be
responding. First, Nowak and Sigmund challenge the robustness of TFT by arguing that a
strategy of Win-Stay, Lose-Shift (WSLS) can outperform TFT. Second, although A&H use
clustering to account for the initial viability of TFT, they owe an explanation of how a cluster of
TFTs could arise in the first place. Finally, A&H account for the stability of TFT by assuming,
without empirical or theoretical support, that the individuals who interact have a sufficiently
large probability of meeting again. I will respond to these three issues in order to improve and
extend A&H’s approach to the evolution of cooperation.
Axelrod and Hamilton begin their paper by claiming that many of the benefits which
living organisms seek are disproportionally available to cooperating groups. 1 The problem, they
claim, is that although one organism can benefit from cooperating with another organism, each
individual can do even better by not cooperating and exploiting the cooperation of others. A&H
use the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a way of formalizing the “strategic possibilities inherent in [these]
situations.”2 In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, two individuals play each other and can either
cooperate or defect. The payoff to the players is measured in terms of fitness gain. If both players
defect, they both receive 1 unit of fitness (the Punishment (P) payoff). If Player 1 cooperates and
1 Axelrod, Robert, and William Hamilton. "The Evolution of Cooperation." Science. 211.4484 (1981): 1390-96.
Print. Pg. 1391.
2 Ibid.

Published by ScholarlyCommons, 2012

1

Momentum, Vol. 1 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 17

Player 2 defects, Player 1 gets 0 units (the Sucker (S) payoff) and Player 2 gets 5 units of fitness
(the Temptation (T) payoff). Since the game is symmetric, if Player 1 defects and Player 2
cooperates, Player 1 will get the T payoff and Player 2 will get the S payoff. Lastly, if both
players cooperate, they will both receive 3 units of fitness (the Reward (R) payoff).
One of the authors, Robert Axelrod, conducted a computer tournament of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. 15 strategies were submitted by professors, professionals, and hobbyists from
around the world. The game lasted 200 moves and the 15 strategies were paired in a round-robin
tournament.3 Although some complex strategies were submitted, TFT attained the highest
average score. TFT is a strategy of reciprocal cooperation; it cooperates on the first move and
then does what the other player did the previous round for all remaining rounds. According to
A&H, TFT is capable of beating the other strategies because it is never the first to defect, it can
retaliate immediately, and it is forgiving (it cooperates after just one act of cooperation by the
other player).i From these results, A&H conclude that TFT is robust; that is, TFT thrives in an
environment with numerous kinds of strategies. 4
In their 1993 paper, Nowak and Sigmund challenge the robustness of TFT. They suggest
that “a strategy of win-stay, lose-shift outperforms tit for tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma.” 5 WinStay, Lose-Shift (WSLS) is a relatively simple strategy: it repeats its move on the previous round
if it obtained the R or T payoff, but switches moves if it only received the P or S payoff. ii Nowak
and Sigmund demonstrate that WSLS is more effective than TFT against an All-Out-Cooperator
(AC). If TFT plays an AC, both players will receive the R payoff every round. This will occur
3 Axelrod and Hamilton, 1393.
4 Ibid.
5 Nowak, Martin, and Karl Sigmund. "A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-that in the Prisoner's
Dilemma game." Nature. 364. (1993): 56-8. Print. Pg. 56.
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because TFT will cooperate the first round and follow AC into cooperating all subsequent
rounds. On the other hand, if WSLS plays AC, once WSLS defects and AC cooperates, WSLS
will defect in all subsequent rounds to obtain the T payoff. In this way, WSLS is able to exploit
the cooperation of AC. Hence, against an AC, WSLS has an advantage over TFT.
Notwithstanding, TFT has two significant advantages over WSLS. First, if we consider
these strategies from the baseline condition of All-Out Defection (AD), which is what existed in
nature before any cooperative strategies evolved, TFT is more viable than WSLS. If TFT plays
AD, TFT will get the S payoff the first round and the P payoff in all subsequent rounds.
Assuming that that TFT plays AD six times, TFT will get a payoff of 5 points. iii If WSLS plays
AD, however, WSLS will oscillate between the S payoff and the P payoff. If WSLS plays AD six
times, WSLS will only obtain a payoff of 3 points. iv Hence, against an AD, TFT will get a higher
payoff than WSLS after a minimum of 4 rounds.v Since defection was the strategy that existed in
nature before cooperative strategies evolved, TFT’s advantage against AD makes it more initially
viable than WSLS. Additionally, WSLS would only have an advantage over TFT if, in addition
to TFT and WSLS evolving, an AC also evolved to play the other strategies. TFT’s success does
not require the emergence of an AC, whereas WSLS’ success does. Therefore, although WSLS
has a theoretical advantage over TFT, the constraints of natural conditions make it such that the
winning situation for WSLS would be extremely unlikely to arise.
In the last two paragraphs, I have argued that even if WSLS does better than TFT against
an AC, TFT has two significant advantages over WSLS. Hence, TFT remains the more robust
strategy. I will now address an issue regarding the initial viability of TFT. A&H state the problem
of initial viability for cooperation as follows: “Even if a strategy is robust and stable, how can it
ever get a foothold in an environment that is predominantly noncooperative?” 6 A&H argue that
6 Axelrod and Hamilton, 1393.
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clustering and genetic kinship theory are two ways in which cooperation could have evolved in a
population of defectors. Although genetic kinship theory is interesting and compelling, I have
chosen to focus on clustering for the sake of simplicity and clarity. vi A cluster may be informally
defined as a number of individuals who employ the same strategy and constantly play each other.
More formally, there are two necessary conditions for a cluster to exist. First, a high proportion
(p) of the interactions of individuals using a strategy must be with others using the same
strategy.vii Second, two individuals who play each other must have a large probability (w) of
interacting again.
A&H claim that when p and w are sufficiently large, a cluster of TFTs can become
initially viable in an environment composed overwhelmingly of defectors. To understand this
claim, it is helpful to analyze the payoffs of the Prisoner’s Dilemma under these conditions. In an
environment entirely composed of defectors, all individuals will receive a payoff of 1*n, where n
stands for the number of interactions. Assuming n = 100, each defector will obtain a payoff of
100. Now, consider how a cluster of TFTs will fare in such an environment. Assuming that n =
100, a TFT will theoretically play other TFTs 70 times (p is large) and two defectors fifteen times
each (w is large). A TFT will thus obtain a payoff of (70*3) + (14*2) = 238. As these simple but
illuminating calculations show, a cluster of TFTs will do much better than the defectors in the
population (238 > 100).
Axelrod and Hamilton convincingly show that a cluster of TFTs can thrive in an
environment composed overwhelmingly of defectors. However, they do not explain how a
cluster of TFTs could arise in the first place. This is an important issue regarding the initial
viability of TFT. I will defend A&H’s approach by providing two ways in which a cluster of
TFTs could arise in a population of defectors. First, a cluster of TFTs could simply come about
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by chance. In particular, this could occur if defectors who lived near each other had offspring that
mutated into TFTs at the same time. The problem with this response is that it relies heavily on
chance. Even considering the length of evolutionary history, the likelihood of a number of
organisms mutating into a specific strategy in the same place and at the same time seems fairly
low. Hence, claiming that a cluster of TFTs evolved purely by chance is not entirely convincing.
There is another explanation for the evolution of TFT clusters which is more plausible. In
particular, a cluster of TFTs could evolve if, in a small group of defectors, a few defectors mutate
into TFTs over time. Unlike the first explanation, this account does not require that several
defectors mutate into TFTs at the same time. Instead, all it requires is that defectors mutate into
TFTs in a nearby area over an extended period of time. It is important, however, that the mutants
belong to a small group of defectors. In a large group of defectors, individuals are not likely to
play each other repeatedly. Hence, in a large group, a defector who mutates into a TFT would not
be very successful; it would constantly play distinct defectors and hence receive mostly Spayoffs (0). In a small group, on the other hand, individuals are more likely to play each other
repeatedly. Therefore, a defector who mutates into a TFT would do much better in a small group.
Although it would receive the S-payoff (0) in the first encounter, it would receive the P-payoff
(1) in all subsequent encounters with the same individual. Hence, if a TFT is playing a small
number of defectors repeatedly, it would obtain a payoff that is close to the defector’s payoff. viii
By doing so, TFTs could survive, reproduce, and form clusters over time.
So far, I have defended the initial viability of TFT by arguing that there are two ways in
which clusters of TFTs could arise. Moreover, I have defended the robustness of TFT by arguing
that TFT has two significant advantages over a strategy of Win-Stay, Lose-Shift. Still, the
stability of TFT remains unsupported. A&H state the problem of stability for cooperation as
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follows: “Under what conditions can such a strategy, once fully established, resist invasion by
mutant strategies?”7 TFT may be initially viable and robust. However, if mutant strategies are
capable of invading it, TFT will not be stable. A&H make the strong claim that TFT can resist
the invasion of any strategy. More specifically, they argue that once TFT is established, if the
individuals who interact have a sufficiently high probability (w) of meeting again, TFT can resist
invasion by any possible mutant strategy. 8 Just like with the initial viability of TFT, A&H use
mathematical expressions to support the stability of TFT. In fact, they demonstrate that no
strategy at all can invade TFT if and only if w ≥ (T – R)(T – P) and w ≥ (T – R)(R – S).
Although the mathematical details are interesting, they are not pressingly important.
Instead, I will present A&H’s argument for the stability of TFT in a more intuitive way. The
general structure of the argument is the following: Neither Always-Cooperate nor Always-Defect
can invade TFT. Moreover, a strategy that alternates between Cooperation and Defection cannot
invade TFT. Hence, no strategy can invade TFT. I will go through each of the parts in greater
detail. First, a strategy of Always-Cooperate (AC) cannot invade TFT. When TFT and AC play,
they will both receive the R payoff (3 each) ever time. Because TFT and AC do equally well, AC
cannot invade TFT. A strategy of Always-Defect (AD) is also incapable of invading TFT. If TFT
plays AD numerous times, TFT will receive the S-payoff (0) the first encounter and the P-payoff
(1) in all subsequent encounters. AD will receive the T-payoff (5) the first round and the P-payoff
(1) for all remaining rounds. Hence, if they play n times, TFT will get a payoff of n-1 and AD
will get a payoff of n+4. Although a difference of 5 units is a slight advantage, it is not
significant enough for AD to invade TFT. There are two reasons why this difference is not
particularly significant. First, since the value of w is high, the number of interactions (n) between
7 Axelrod and Hamilton, 1393.
8 Ibid.
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two individuals will be large. Hence, for example, if n = 50, TFT will obtain a payoff of 59,
while AD will receive a payoff of 64. Both individuals are obtaining large enough payoffs to
potentially survive in the population. Secondly, these calculations do not take into account TFT’s
interactions with other TFTs. Every time TFT plays another TFT, it reaps the R-payoff (3). On
the other hand, every time AD plays another AD, it only receives the P-payoff (1). Thus, as long
as TFTs play each other a few times, they will obtain a larger payoff than ADs. ix Finally, a
strategy that alternates between cooperation and defection will not be able to invade TFT. If TFT
plays the Alternating Strategy (AS), the best AS can do is get a payoff that is 5 units greater than
TFT.x Again, although this is a slight advantage, given a large n value and the interaction among
TFTs, 5 units is not enough for AS to invade TFT. By showing that AC, AD, and AS are
incapable of invading TFT, A&H conclude that no strategy is capable of invading TFT. xi
A&H convincingly argue that if individuals who interact have a sufficiently high
probability (w) of meeting again, TFT can resist invasion by any possible mutant strategy.
Nevertheless, A&H provide no theoretical or empirical support for the large value of w. The
artificiality of this assumption is an important issue regarding the stability of TFT. I will defend
the stability of TFT by arguing that even if the value of w is low, a group of TFTs can employ
norms and metanorms to prevent other strategies from invading. Before developing this
argument, however, it is important to clarify why a low value of w would threaten the stability of
TFT. The point can be illustrated with the following example: Suppose that a defector begins
playing a group of 4 TFTs. Since w is low, the defector will only play each TFT once. While the
defector will reap a payoff of 12 (4 interactions * T-Payoff (3)), TFTs will receive a payoff of 0,
since they will obtain the Sucker (0) payoff every time they play the defector. By obtaining such
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large payoffs, defectors could survive, reproduce, and invade a group of TFTs. In this way, the
stability of TFT is undermined by a sufficiently low w.
Even though the stability of TFT is undermined by a low value of w, TFTs can employ
other mechanisms to strengthen their stability. In his paper An Evolutionary Approach to Norms,
Robert Axelrod suggests a way in which a group could detect and punish defectors, thereby
reinforcing its own stability. Although he does not directly argue that the use of norms and metanorms strengthens the stability of TFT, his analysis is relevant and important. Axelrod defines a
norm as existing “to the extent that individuals usually act in a certain way and are often
punished when seen not to be acting in this way.” 9 In order to investigate the growth and decay
of norms, Axelrod developed the Norm Game. In the game, an individual has an opportunity to
defect, accompanied by a chance of being observed by others. If the individual chooses to defect,
he/she receives the Temptation payoff (3). Furthermore, if an individual sees another individual
defecting, he/she may choose to punish the defector. In this case, the defector will receive the
Painful Payoff (-9) and the enforcer will also pay an Enforcement Cost (-2). Axelrod tracks the
players’ strategies using two dimensions: boldness, which refers to how much a player defects,
and vengefulness, which refers to how much a player punishes someone who is defecting.
Axelrod ran the Norm Game five rounds and found the following pattern. First, the
boldness level of players decreased significantly. Since the vengefulness level in the population
was initially quite high, it became very costly to be bold. Hence, individuals stopped defecting.
Once the boldness level fell, vengefulness started decreasing as well. The reason this happened is
that once boldness was sufficiently low, the incentive to punish a few defectors was not worth the
Enforcement Cost (-2). Finally, once the vengefulness level fell to nearly zero, there was a
9 Axelrod, Robert. "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms."American Political Science Review. 80.4 (1986): 10951111. Print. Pg. 1097.
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significant increase in boldness. Although one might expect vengefulness to rise with the
increase in boldness, this did not occur. Instead, a state of high boldness and low vengefulness
remained stable. From running the Norm Game several times, Axelrod concludes that the
problem with establishing a norm is that no individual has a direct incentive to punish a
defection.10 As a result, Axelrod explores different mechanisms that can serve to support a norm.
One mechanism he suggests is the use of metanorms. A metanorm may be defined (in the
context of Axelrod’s game) as the expectation that individuals will punish those who do not
punish a defection. Axelrod formulates a Metanorm Game to explore the effectiveness of this
mechanism. The game is essentially the same as the Norm Game, but with the important addition
that if an individual is caught seeing and not punishing a defection, the other players have a
chance to punish that individual. Five runs of the Metanorm Game were conducted, yielding
unambiguous results. In all runs of the game, the norm against defection was established;
vengefulness quickly increased to a high level and boldness subsequently decreased. Axelrod
claims that the results are not surprising. Since players had a personal incentive to be vengeful
(that is, to escape punishment for not punishing an observed defection), individuals made sure to
punish all instances of defection. As a result, the system became self-policing and the norm
became well-established.11
The use of norms and metanorms is a mechanism which clusters of TFTs could employ to
prevent other strategies from invading. There are two ways in which this mechanism strengthens
the stability of a TFT cluster. First, by punishing an act of defection, the defector’s fitness is
directly undermined. This is represented in the game by the Painful Payoff (-9). Even if the
defector obtains the Temptation Payoff (+5), the gain will be outweighed by the Painful Payoff (10 Axelrod, 1100.
11 Axelrod, 1102.
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9) received through punishment. There is also a more subtle way in which the use of norms and
metanorms can strengthen the stability of a TFT cluster. If a defector is punished by a cluster of
TFTs, this sends a clear signal that if the defector decides to play another member of the cluster,
it will suffer another strong punishment. As a result of this signal, the defector will be less likely
to play another member of the cluster in the future. By preventing defectors from coming back, a
cluster of TFTs can minimize the number of times that they interact with defectors and hence
minimize the number of times that they receive the Sucker Payoff (0). This subtle advantage may
not apply to all groups. In particular, it probably will only apply to organisms that have
recognition capacities and memory systems. Still, it is an interesting way in which norms and
metanorms can strengthen the stability of some groups of cooperators.
In the last couple of pages, I have argued that even if w is low, a group of TFTs can
remain stable by employing norms and metanorms as mechanisms for punishing defectors.
Although this has theoretical appeal, a salient charge is that it is empirically ungrounded. I will
address this issue by making a few remarks about the empirical support for the use of norms and
metanorms in nature. First, human beings employ a wide variety of norms and metanorms. 12
Sometimes they are enforced openly and aggressively, as in the case of international conflict
when one country defects on another. Other times, norms are enforced subtly through the
manipulation of feelings such as guilt and shame. There is also evidence that chimpanzees
employ norms and metanorms. In his book “Chimpanzee Politics”, Frans de Waal discusses the
formation of large coalitions of chimpanzees. De Waal argues that chimpanzees act selectively
when intervening in a conflict between other members of the group, taking into account the other
chimpanzees’ history of collaboration. 13 Thus, there is evidence that chimpanzees abide by norms
12 Fehr, Ernst, and Urs Fischbacher. "Social norms and human cooperation." Trends in Cognitive Science. 8.4
(2004): 185-90. Print. Pg. 185.
13 de Waal, Frans. Chimpanzee Politics. Baltimor: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007. 31. Print.
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pertaining to conflict resolution. It is important to mention that species that have less complex
social systems probably do not employ norms and metanorms. Hence, the stability of these
groups must depend on other factors. However, for species that have intricate social systems,
there is theoretical and empirical support that norms and metanorms can help strengthen the
stability of cooperating groups.
I have now responded to the third and final issue regarding A&H’s approach to the
evolution of cooperation. In particular, I have argued that even if the value of w is low, socially
intricate groups can remain stable by employing norms and metanorms. I provided both
theoretical and empirical support for this claim. Additionally, I have responded to two other
issues regarding A&H’s model. First, I responded to Nowak and Sigmund’s challenge by arguing
that although WSLS does better than TFT against a Cooperator, TFT does better than WSLS
against a Defector. Since Defection is the strategy that existed in nature before any cooperative
strategies evolved, TFT is a more robust strategy than WSLS. Secondly, regarding the initial
viability of TFT, I pressed A&H’s account by arguing that they owe an explanation of how a
cluster of TFTs could arise in a population of defectors. I responded to this issue by arguing that
a cluster of TFTs could arise in two ways: First, it could arise simply by chance, and second, it
could arise by the occurrence of several mutations in a small group of defectors. With these three
arguments, I defended the robustness, stability, and initial viability of TFT.
To end, I will suggest one way of extending my analysis which I chose not to explore in
this paper for the sake of focus and clarity. In defending A&H’s model, I only discussed one-toone player interactions. Extending my analysis to multiple-player interactions would further
strengthen A&H’s approach to the evolution of cooperation. For example, I argued that clusters
of TFTs can arise if defectors mutate into TFTs in a small group of defectors. Exploring whether
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this would still hold in groups with multiple-player interactions would extend A&H’s model.
Together with my defense of the robustness, stability, and initial viability of TFT, this analysis
would significantly enhance A&H’s general perspective on the evolution of cooperation.
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